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Returning the "Balance" to Design Defect
Litigation in Pennsylvania: A Critique of
Azzarello v. Black Brothers Company
I. Introduction
The search for a workable standard applicable to defective de-
sign cases1 has generated voluminous commentary2 and a considera-
ble amount of confusion regarding the application of strict liability.
1. This comment does not concern cases involving manufacturing flaws. The difference
between design defect cases and manufacturing defect cases was summarized by Professor
Twerski as follows:
In a design defect . . . case . . . there is no claim that the unit which caused
injury to the plaintiff is any different from any other unit of the same model
produced by the manufacturers. The claim, instead, is that an entire model line
or particular feature of an entire model line is defective. Since there is nothing
'wrong' with the products per se, the term 'defective' has no meaning without
reference to some external standard. It is here that the battle lines are formed.
Twerski, From Defect to Cause to Comparative Fault-Rethinking Some Product Liability
Concepts, 60 MARQ. L. REV. 297, 303 (1977).
2. See, e.g., Birnbaum, Unmasking the Test for Design Defect: From Negligence [to
Warranty] to Strict Liability to Negligence, 33 VAND. L. REV. 593 (1980) [hereinafter cited
as Birnbaum, Unmasking the Test]; Donaher, A Response to Sherk: Chagrin Without Despair
and Hope Without Presumption, 21 DuQ. L. REV. 917 (1983) [hereinafter cited as Donaher,
A Response to Sherk]; Fischer, Products Liability-Functionally Imposed Strict Liability, 32
OKLA. L. REV. 93 (1979) [hereinafter cited as Fischer, Products Liability]; Henderson, Why
Creative Judging Won't Save the Products Liability System, It HoFSTRA L. REV. 845 (1983)
[hereinafter cited as Henderson, Creative Judging]; Henderson, Renewed Judicial Controversy
Over Defective Product Desigt Toward the Preservation of an Emerging Consensus, 63
MINN. L. REV. 773 (1979) [hereinafter cited as Henderson, Renewed Judicial Controversy];
Henderson, Judicial Review of Manufacturers' Conscious Design Choices: The Limits of Ad-
judication, 73 COLUM. L. REV. 1533 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Henderson, Judicial Review
of Design Choices]; Keeton, Products Liability-Design Hazards and the Meaning of Defect,
10 CUM. L. REV. 293 (1979) [hereinafter cited as Keeton, Design Hazards]; Keeton, Product
Liability and the Meaning of Defect, 5 ST. MARY'S L.J. 30 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Kee-
ton, The Meaning of Defect]; O'Donnell, Design Litigation and Strict Liability: The Problem
of Jury Instructions Which Do Not Instruct, 56 U. DET. J. URB. L. 1051 (1979) [hereinafter
cited as O'Donnell, Design Litigation]; Phillips, The Standard for Determining Defectiveness
in Products Liability, 46 U. CIN. L. REV. 1010 (1977); Schwartz, Understanding Products
Liability Law, 67 CALIF. L. REv. 435 (1979); Twerski, From Risk-Utility to Consumer Ex-
pectations: Enhancing the Role of Judicial Screening in Product Liability Litigation, 11 HOF-
STRA L. REv. 861 (1983) [hereinafter cited as Twerski, Enhanced Judicial Screening]; Twer-
ski, Seizing the Middle Ground Between Rules and Standards in Design Defect Litigation:L
Advancing Directed Verdict Practice in the Law of Torts, 57 N.Y.U.L. REV. 521 (1982)
[hereinafter cited as Twerski, Seizing the Middle Ground]; Wade, On Product "Design De-
fects" and Their Actionability, 33 VAND. L. REV. 551 (1980) [hereinafter cited as Wade, On
Design Defects]; Wade, On the Nature of Strict Tort Liability for Products, 44 Miss. L. J.
825 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Wade, On the Nature of Strict Liability]; Walkowiak, Prod-
uct Liability Litigation and the Concept of Defective Goods: "Reasonableness" Revisited?, 44
J. AIR L. 705 (1979) [hereinafter cited as Walkowiak, Reasonableness Revisited].
Pennsylvania courts have not been immune from this confusion' and
have sought to remedy it in a series of decisions4 culminating in 1978
in the case of Azzarello v. Black Brothers Co.5 In Azzarello, the
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania made its most extensive pronounce-
ments concerning strict products liability since the Commonwealth's
adoption of section 402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts.6
This comment examines the Azzarello decision and enumerates
and analyzes the most significant changes the decision has brought
about in the state's products liability law. The comment then identi-
fies areas most in need of clarification and modification. Several sug-
gestions are proposed with a view toward reducing the uncertainty
generated by the Azzarello decision. Although the proposals present
significant departures from the Azzarello opinion, these changes
would enable courts to better accomplish the policy objectives of de-
sign defect law.
II. A Summary of Azzarello
Azzarello v. Black Brothers Co.7 is a benchmark case in the
history of Pennsylvania products liability law.8 It is the latest in a
3. See Donaher, A Response to Sherk, supra, note 2, at 920.
4. See Berkebile v. Brantly Helicopter Corp., 462 Pa. 83, 337 A.2d 893 (1975) (plu-
rality of the court held that use of the term "unreasonably dangerous" in a jury instruction on
defect is improper); Salvador v. Atlantic Steel Boiler Co., 457 Pa. 24, 319 A.2d 903 (1974)
(elimination of horizontal privity requirement in action for breach of warranty); Webb v.
Zern, 422 Pa. 424, 220 A.2d 853 (1966) (adoption of §402A of Restatement (Second) of
Torts (1965)).
5. 480 Pa. 547, 391 A.2d 1020 (1978).
6. That section provides: §402A Special Liability of Seller of Product for Harm
to User or Consumer
(I) One who sells any product in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous
to the user or consumer or to his property is subject to liability for physical harm
thereby caused to the ultimate user or consumer, or to his property, if
(a) the seller is engaged in the business of selling such a product, and
(b) it is expected to and does reach the user or consumer without substan-
tial change in the condition in which it is sold.
(2) The rule stated in Subsection (I) applies although
(a) the seller has exercised all possible care in the preparation and sale of
his product, and
(b) the user or consumer has not bought the product from or entered into
any contractual relation with the seller.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §402A (1965).
7. 480 Pa. 547, 391 A.2d 1020 (1978).
8. This comment does not provide a general description of the history of products
liability law in Pennsylvania. For such a treatment see Comment, Substantial Change: Altera-
tion of a Product as a Bar to a Manufacturer's Strict Liability, 80 DICK. L. REv. 245 (1975);
Comment, Products Liability in Pennsylvania, 13 VILL. L. REV. 245 (1975). For a clear,
concise history of the relevant Pennsylvania case law see Hammond v. International Harvester
Co., 691 F.2d 646, 649-50 (3d Cir. 1982).
In addition, this comment will not analyze various legislative attempts to establish product
liability standards. For a collection of such statutes see Twerski, Seizing the Middle Ground,
supra note 2, at 525 and notes 15 and 16. Professor Twerski views this legislation with consid-
erable skepticism:
The legislative effort to date has been not only reactionary but illogical as well.
line of progressively more liberal decisions both in the law of defec-
tive products and in the general tort law of the Commonwealth. 9 The
Pennsylvania Supreme Court used the case as an opportunity to ex-
pand concepts it had developed previously and to establish a new
framework for products liability cases.
In Azzarello, the plaintiff was employed as an operator of a
coating machine when her hand was pinched between two hard rub-
ber rollers. She brought suit against the manufacturer on a theory of
defective design under the Restatement (Second) of Torts section
402A. 10 While instructing the jury, the trial judge "repeatedly" used
the phrase "unreasonably dangerous" provided by the drafters of the
Restatement."1 The Azzarello court unanimously agreed with the
plaintiff and went further to address issues concerning the status of
the manufacturer, the definition of "defective" and the allocation of
function between the judge and jury in defective product cases.
The court noted that the development of modern industrial soci-
ety has brought about significant changes in the legal duties of man-
ufacturers. The manufacturer of a product is now considered a
"guarantor" of its safety.' 2 The court stated that the primary policy
objective of strict liability is to place upon the manufacturer the risk
The problem cannot be passed off as one created by politically powerful lobbies
who have imposed their views on legislative bodies; it goes much deeper. The
legislative effort will remain ineffectual and at times irrational because the law
of torts cannot be effectively legislated. There are too many nuances that require
the touch of a common law judge.
Twerski, Seizing the Middle Ground, supra, note 2, at 595.
9. One federal court has characterized the trend in Pennsylvania defective products
decisions as follows:
[T]he attitude of the Pennsylvania courts has been more expansive than restric-
tive. The underlying policy has been to hold strictly liable for ensuing harm all
suppliers of products because they are engaged in the business of selling or sup-
plying a product and have assumed a special responsibility toward the consum-
ing public.
Abdul-Warith v. Arthur McKee and Co., 488 F. Supp. 306, 310 (E.D. Pa. 1980). The Penn-
sylvania Supreme Court has taken upon itself the duty "to change the substantive tort law
where it has been determined that the needs of a changing society so dictated." Kaczkowski v.
Bolubasz, 491 Pa. 561, 565, 421 A.2d 1027, 1029 (1980).
10. See supra note 5.
11. 480 Pa. at 550, 391 A.2d at 1022.
12. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has discussed the manufacturer's role as follows:
The development of a sophisticated and complex industrial society with its
proliferation of new products and vast changes in the private enterprise system
has inspired a change in legal philosophy from the principle of caveat emptor
which prevailed in the early nineteenth century market place to the view that a
supplier of products should be deemed to be 'the guarantor of his products'
safety.' The realities of our economic society as it exists today forces [sic) the
conclusion that the risk of loss for injury resulting from defective products
should be borne by the suppliers, principally because they are in a position to
absorb the loss by distributing it as a cost of doing business. In an era of giant
corporate structures, utilizing the national media to sell their wares, the original
concern for an emerging manufacturing industry has given way to the view that
it is now the consumer who must be protected.
480 Pa. at 553, 391 A.2d at 1023-24 (citation omitted).
of loss regardless of the lack of privity with the injured plaintiff.13
"Guarantor" status, however, is not coextensive with "insurer" sta-
tus." Hence, the plaintiff must prove not only that the product prox-
imately caused the injury suffered, but also that the product was
unsafe.' 5
The Azzarello decision also addressed the propriety of including
the phrase "unreasonably dangerous" in a jury instruction defining
"defective". According to the court, the term "unreasonably danger-
ous" has no "independent" significance and is a mere "label" applied
to a product after it had been decided that the manufacturer should
bear the risk of the plaintiff's loss.' 6 The court relied heavily upon a
decision of the California Supreme Court which held that inclusion
of the "unreasonably dangerous" limitation of the Restatement
would "burden the plaintiff with proof of an element which rings of
negligence".
17
To its decision deleting the "unreasonably dangerous" language,
the Azzarello court added the following definition of "defective" for
inclusion in jury instructions.
The [supplier] of a product is the guarantor of its safety. The
product must, therefore, be provided with every element neces-
sary to make it safe for [its intended] use, and without any con-
dition that makes it unsafe for [its intended] use. If you find
that the product, at the time it left the defendant's control, lack-
ed any element necessary to make it safe for [its intended] use
or contained any condition that made it unsafe for [its intended]
use, then the product was defective and the defendant is liable
for all harm caused by such defect.' 8
Finally, the court stated that determination of the point at
which the utility of a product outweighs the risks it poses is a deter-
mination of law to be made by the presiding judge." This balancing
13. 480 Pa. at 553, 391 A.2d at 1024.
14. "While this expansion of the supplier's responsibility for injuries resulting from
defects in his products has placed the supplier in the role of a guarantor of his product's safety,
it was not intended to make him an insurer of all injuries caused by the product." Id.
15. 480 Pa. at 555, 391 A.2d at 1025.
16. Id. at 556, 391A.2d at 1025.
17. Cronin v. J.B.E. Olson Corp., 8 Cal. 3d 121, 132, 501 P.2d 1153, 1161, 104 Cal.
Rptr. 433, 442 (1972).
18. 480 Pa. at 559 n.12, 391 A.2d at 1027 n.12.
19. The court reasoned that this balancing test was a judicial function as follows:
Should an ill-conceived design which exposes the user to the risk of harm
entitle one injured by the product to recover? Should adequate warnings of the
dangerous propensities of an article insulate one who suffers injuries from those
propensities? When does the utility of a product outweigh the unavoidable dan-
ger it may pose? These are questions of law and their resolution depends upon
social policy. . . . It is a judicial function to decide whether, under plaintiff's
averment of the facts, recovery would be justified; and only after this judicial
determination is made is the cause submitted to the jury to determine whether
the facts of the case support the averments of the complaint.
test involves important issues of "social policy" not "within the orbit
of a factual dispute" and is therefore outside the province of the
jury.2
0
III. Manufacturer as Guarantor of a Product's Safety
In Azzarello v. Black Brothers Co., the Supreme Court of
Pennsylvania began its discussion by establishing that the manufac-
turer of a product assumes the status of a "guarantor" of its safety.2"
This language was first used in Salvador v. Atlantic Steel Boiler
Co.,22 a case involving an action for breach of warranty. In Salva-
dor, the court stated that the "manufacturer by virtue of section
402A is effectively the guarantor of his product's safety."2 8 The Sal-
vador decision cited two cases in support of this characterization,24
neither of which used the term "guarantor". Not surprisingly, aca-
demic commentators have puzzled over the implications of the Az-
zarello court's choice of words.25
In its effort to limit manufacturers' liability, the Azzarello court
explained that "guarantor" status is not the same as "insurer" sta-
tus.2" The court adopted an analysis which emphasizes that strict
liability is not coextensive with absolute liability.27 This elaboration
does not clarify the confusion surrounding use of the terms "guaran-
tor" and "insurer".
While it is clear that the court did not intend to make manufac-
turers absolutely liable for defective products, the academic commu-
nity has voiced concern over the effect of repeated use of the term
480 Pa. at 558, 391 A.2d at 1026.
20. Id.
21. See supra note 12.
22. 457 Pa. 24, 319 A.2d 903 (1974).
23. Id. at 32, 319 A.2d at 907 (emphasis added).
24. Kassab v. Central Soya, 432 Pa. 217, 246 A.2d 848 (1968); Webb v. Zern, 422 Pa.
424, 220 A.2d 853 (1966).
25. See Wade, On Design Defects, supra note 2, at 567 n.81; O'Donnell, Design Limi-
tation, supra note 2, at 1070-73.
26. See supra note 14.
27. The court utilized a quote by Dean Wade from an early article on strict products
liability:
What do we mean when we speak of strict liability of a manufacturer for
harm caused by his product? It is [sic] sufficient for a plaintiff to show that he
used the defendant's product and was injured? The answer to this is no. If the
plaintiff's theory is breach of warranty, he must prove the breach-i.e. that the
article was not merchantible or was not fit for the purpose sold. If the theory is
strict liability in tort, the plaintiff must still prove that the article was unsafe in
some way. Thus, the liability is not that of an insurer; it is not absolute in the
literal sense of that word.
Wade, Strict Tort Liability of Manufacturers, 19 Sw. L.J. 5, 13 (1965) quoted in Azzarello
v. Black Brothers Co., 480 Pa. 547, 553 n.5, 391 A.2d 1020, 1024 n.5 (1978). Dean Wade has
expressed some confusion regarding the manner in which the Pennsylvania Supreme Court
explained "guarantor" status. In a footnote to his analysis of Azzarello, he asks: "What is the
difference between an insurer and a guarantor?" Wade, On Design Defects, supra note 2, at
567 n.81.
"guarantor" in a jury's presence. a8 The Court of Appeals for the
Fourth Circuit has indicated its dismay with the Azzarello standard
by describing Pennsylvania law as the new "frontier" in products
liability jurisprudence. 9 Unwilling to join Pennsylvania, the Fourth
Circuit instead opted to remain with the Restatement position which
it perceived as a more appropriate standard in products liability
cases. 30 The Fourth Circuit's choice was based upon its impression
that "guarantor" status under Azzarello is substantially similar to, if
not the same as, "insurer" status.
The drafters of the Restatement did not intend to create in-
surer's liability under section 402A.3 1 Courts interpreting Azzarello
have seized upon the Pennsylvania Supreme Court's distinction be-
tween strict liability and absolute liability to justify decisions limit-
ing manufacturers' liability."2 This distinction, however, had been es-
tablished in Pennsylvania law since adoption of section 402A in
1966.18 The addition of the "guarantor" language in Salvador and
its later use in Azzarello did not help to clarify the duties of manu-
facturers. Its use has created confusion regarding the appropriate
standard to be applied to manufacturers. The most effective way to
alleviate uncertainty and address academic criticism is to remove the
term "guarantor" from the language of products liability law in
Pennsylvania. Since the textual analysis in Azzarello effectively ex-
plains that manufacturers are not insurers of their product's safety,3"
28. Professor O'Donnell voiced his concern as follows:
To most people, 'guarantor' is not a technical term but a reference to a reassur-
ingly familiar part of a routine purchase. Niceties aside, in everyday experience
a guarantee means that a seller promises that an event will not occur or that he
will pay if it does. Questions of causation are secondary if they matter at all; the
important thing is the implicit assurance. Otherwise, the jurors might well con-
clude, there would be no reason for the court to characterize the seller in such
sweeping and conclusory terms.
O'Donnell, Design Litigation, supra note 2, at 1072.
29. Pennsylvania has made the manufacturer the guarantor of his product's safety. By
eliminating proof and a consideration of the 'unreasonably dangerous' element and by requir-
ing the manufacturer to provide with the product every element necessary to make a product
safe for its use, the Pennsylvania courts have extended strict liability to a frontier not yet
approached by South Carolina.
Reed v. Tiffin Motor Homes, Inc., 697 F.2d 1192, 1197-98 (4th Cir. 1982).
30. Id. at 1198.
31. The notion underlying the Restatement formulation was that "the product was not
defective for the purpose of shifting losses due to physically harmful events unless it was 'un-
reasonably dangerous.'" Keeton, The Meaning of Defect, supra note 2, at 32 (emphasis
added).
32. See, e.g., Lesnefsky v. Fischer & Porter Co., Inc. 527 F. Supp. 951 (E.D. Pa. 1981)
(manufacturer of a component part designed by buyer is not liable for defective design because
holding manufacturer liable would make him an insurer); Sochanski v. Sears, Roebuck and
Co., 477 F. Supp. 316 (E.D. Pa. 1979) (Azzarello requires that the plaintiff eliminate all
reasonable causes of injury except the defect; otherwise manufacturer is an insurer); LoBianco
v. Property Protection, Inc., 292 Pa. Super. 346, 437 A.2d 417 (1981) (Guarantor status does
not require liability where plaintiff can better shoulder the risk of loss).
33. See Webb v. Zern, 422 Pa. 424, 220 A.2d 853 (1966).
34. See supra note 14.
removal of the term "guarantor" would significantly reduce the po-
tential for misunderstanding the duty imposed by strict liability.
IV. Eliminating "Unreasonably Dangerous" From Jury Instruc-
tions in Products Liability Cases
A. The Concern Over Negligence Concepts
In Berkebile v. Brantly Helicopter Corp.,85 a plurality of the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court ruled that inclusion of the term "un-
reasonably dangerous" in a jury instruction defining "defective" is
inappropriate in a strict products liability case. 3' The Berkebile
court noted its basic agreement with the California Supreme Court's
analysis in Cronin v. J.B.E. Olson Corp. 7 The California court there
reasoned that a jury would be misled by a by a literal reading of
section 402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts,"8 and would be-
lieve that the plaintiff was required to prove both product unsafety
and manufacturer negligence before liability could be imposed. 9
The Cronin court felt that the words "unreasonably dangerous"
"ring of negligence" and are therefore unsuited to a case to be de-
cided without recourse to a standard of conduct.4 °
In Azzarello v. Black Brothers Co.," the Pennsylvania Su-
preme Court unanimously held that the Restatement's "unreasona-
bly dangerous" language should not be used in a jury instruction.
Azzarello, however, went further than either Cronin or Berkebile by
35. 462 Pa. 83, 337 A.2d 893 (1975).
36. Id. at 97, 337 A.2d at 900.
37. 8 Cal. 3d 121, 501 P.2d 1153, 104 Cal. Rptr. 433 (1972).
38. See supra note 6.
39. The Cronin court stated that
[o]f particular concern is the susceptibility of Restatement section 402A to a
literal reading which would require the finder of fact to conclude that the prod-
uct is, first, defective and second, unreasonably dangerous. . . . We think a
requirement that a plaintiff also prove that the defect made the product 'unrea-
sonably dangerous' places upon him a significantly increased burden and repre-
sents a step backward in the area pioneered by this court.
8 Cal. 3d at 133, 501 P.2d at 1162, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 442. The Azzarello court demonstrated
its concern regarding the mistaken imposition of a dual burden by quoting Professor Keeton's
observations on the subject, which indicate that the "unreasonably dangerous" phrase was
"intended" to set forth "only one" requirement. Azzarello v. Black Brothers Co., 480 Pa. 547,
555 n.7, 391 A.2d 1020, 1024 n.7 (1978) quoting Keeton, The Meaning of Defect, supra note
2, at 32. Nevertheless, the majority view regards "the language of section 402A and its com-
ments literally, so as to require proof of both a defect and unreasonable danger." Swartz, The
Concepts of "Defective Condition" and "Unreasonably Dangerous" in Products Liability Law,
66 MARQ. L. REV. 280, 287-88 (1983).
40. 8 Cal. 3d at 132, 501 P.2d at 1162, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 442. One commentator
described the California court's treatment of this issue as a "misguided attempt... to avoid a
wholly imagined confusion of the principles of negligence and strict liability" that has "degen-
erated into a cosmetic exercise as mystifying as it is pretentious." Donaher, A Response to
Sherk, supra note 2, at 919.
41. 480 Pa. 547, 391 A.2d 1020 (1978).
eliminating findings of reasonableness from the jury's purview."2 The
court argued that the question whether a product's utility outweighs
its risks is solely one of law for the judge.4 The jury's function is
limited to determining whether the product's condition when it
leaves the manufacturer's control matches the condition described in
averments of the complaint.4'
B. Scope of the Prohibition of Negligence Concepts
Courts have expressed varying opinions concerning the effect of
Azzarello on subsequent products liability cases. In Varner v. Pretty
Products, Inc.,45 the Pennsylvania Superior Court affirmed a jury in-
struction on "defect" which stated that the plaintiffs could recover if
the jury found that the product "was delivered in a defective condi-
tion or was unreasonably dangerous". 4'6 Because the plaintiff was
proceeding on dual theories of strict liability and negligence, and be-
cause the instruction was phrased in the disjunctive, the court be-
lieved that the phrase "unreasonably dangerous" unambiguously re-
ferred to the negligence theory.'7 This reading of Azzarello implies
that use of the Restatement terminology on strict liability is appro-
priate in a case brought under a negligence theory.' 8 Varner v.
Pretty Products, Inc., however, is not representative of the majority
of cases decided since Azzarello. The majority of cases have demon-
strated a divergence of opinion on whether the entire trial or only the
jury instructions must be purged of negligence language."9
The most restrictive reading of Azzarello absolutely prohibits
negligence language as well as evidence bearing on the issue of rea-
sonable care. 50 A less restrictive interpretation prohibits negligence
42. See supra note 19. A balancing test is usually used to determine whether a prod-
uct's design embodies an unreasonable danger. See, e.g., Mitchell v. Fruehauf Corp., 568 F.2d
1139, 1145 (5th Cir. 1978) ("the balancing test is simply an expression of the concept of
unreasonable danger").
43. 480 Pa. at 556, 391 A.2d at 1025.
44. Id. at 558, 391 A.2d at 1028.
45. 270 Pa. Super. 86, 410 A.2d 1261 (1979).
46. Id. at 88, 410 A.2d at 1262 (emphasis added).
47. The court was confident that insertion of the word "or" between the terms "defec-
tive condition" and "unreasonably dangerous" adequately guided the jury and that no "com-
ingling of principles" resulted. Id.
48. The court's decision in Varner v. Pretty Products, Inc. should be read very nar-
rowly because the case involved dual theories. Judge Montgomery's dissent indicates that the
presence of Restatement language in the case was reversible error even though a negligence
theory was propounded. 270 Pa. Super. at 88-89, 410 A.2d at 1263 (Montgomery, J.,
dissenting).
49. See, e.g., Orion Insurance Co., Ltd. v. United Technologies Corp., 502 F. Supp.
173 (E.D. Pa. 1980) (Azzarello does not eliminate consideration of reasonableness from the
court's determination of liability); Meyer by Meyer v. Heilman, 307 Pa. Super. 184, 452 A.2d
1376 (1982) (the court, in entry of non-suit, may not consider whether a defect is unreasona-
bly dangerous); Smialek v. Chrysler Motors Corp., 290 Pa. Super. 496, 434 A.2d 1253 (1981)
(Azzarello prohibits use of negligence standards in jury instruction).
50. See, e.g., Holloway v. J.B. Systems, Ltd., 609 F.2d 1069, 1073 (3d Cir. 1979)
language in jury instructions while permitting admission of certain
types of evidence traditionally identified with negligence issues."
The more restrictive view of Azzarello should be abandoned because
it eliminates the opportunity for defendants to produce evidence con-
cerning the reasonableness of their design choices.52 The proscription
on negligence language in jury instructions could be retained as a
means of focusing the jury's attention toward the product and away
from the manufacturer.
C Intimation of Absolute Liability
Since Azzarello, courts have unanimously held that the decision
whether a product is unreasonably dangerous is outside the province
of the jury.' 3 The Azzarello court was of the opinion that determina-
tion of the point at which the utility of a product exceeds its risk is a
matter of judicial concern because it involves important social conse-
quences.54 Conversely, the determination whether a product lacks an
element necessary to make it safe for use and is therefore defective is
a question of fact to be decided by a jury.55 As a result of this nar-
row view of the jury's responsibilities, the Azzarello court's sug-
gested jury instruction 5 appears suspiciously similar to one estab-
lishing absolute liability. 57 Because the jury is instructed to find a
product defective if it left the manufacturer's control without an "el-
ement necessary to make it safe for use,' 8 the jury's function is
rather elementary. It need only determine whether the product could
have been more safe.'0 If so, the product must have lacked some
(Azzarello required "evidence and jury instructions" containing negligence concepts to be kept
out of strict liability cases).
St. The "middle ground" interpretation of Azzarello would allow introduction of evi-
dence bearing on the manufacturer's conduct where necessary to establish facts not related to
the product's condition. For example, where evidence of trade custom is required to identify
the point in the production process where safety devices need to be installed and evidence is
necessary to show which of several defendants is responsible for that installation, such evidence
is admitted. See Powell v. E. W. Bliss Co., 529 F. Supp. 48, 53 (E.D. Pa. 1981).
52. Such evidence includes information on the "state of the art" in the particular trade
or industry involved. While Azzarello has been read as prohibiting this evidence, the majority
view is that state of the art evidence is admissible in design defect cases. See Reed v. Tiffin
Motor Homes, Inc., 697 F.2d 1192, 1198, 1198 n.8 (4th Cit. 1982).
53. See Smialek v. Chrysler Motors Corp., 290 Pa. Super. 496, 434 A.2d 1253 (1981)
(the court has the task of weighing the relative risks and utilities of the product).
54. 480 Pa. at 558, 391 A.2d at 1026.
55. Id. at 556, 391 A.2d at 1025. This reallocation has significant consequences for the
judges role in design defect cases. See infra notes 119-178 and accompanying text.
56. See supra text accompanying note 18.
57. The "absolute liability" position of Azzarello has been adopted by several academic
commentators. See Birnbaum, Unmasking the Test, supra note 2, at 648-49; Henderson, Re-
newed Judicial Controversy, supra note 2, at 801; O'Donnell, Design Limitations, supra note
2, at 1072. In his discussion of Azzarello, Professor Donaher states that the absence of balanc-
ing language may suggest or even compel the conclusion that the court established an absolute
liability standard. Donaher, A Response to Sherk, supra note 2, at 920.
58. See supra text accompanying note 18.
59. Birnbaum, Unmasking the Test, supra note 2, at 637.
element which would have decreased the danger. The jury need not
concern itself with factors bearing upon the ability of the manufac-
turer to adopt the necessary design changes. 0 Under this literal
reading of the instruction, it appears to impose absolute liability.
When coupled with the court's characterization of the manufacturer
as "guarantor," this definition of "defect" leaves a defendant with a
narrow range of available defenses.61
Ironically, California - whose courts furnished analytical guid-
ance in Azzarello - has charged the jury with the responsibility of
weighing the risk and utility of a product's design. In Barker v. Lull
Engineering Co., Inc.,2 the California Supreme Court again refused
to allow the Restatement terminology to be read to the jury. Never-
theless, responsibility for determining whether a product's design is
unreasonably dangerous is placed squarely upon the jury.6"
D. Necessity of Instructing the Jury to Balance Utility and Risk
Many commentators, including Dean John Wade and Professor
Page Keeton, have emphasized the importance of jury balancing to
determine whether a design is unreasonably dangerous."' Although
scholars disagree over whether the jury should be instructed in the
specific factors to be balanced, 65 they unanimously agree that juries
should perform the required analysis. 6 Dean Wade has consistently
written67 that the function of the jury is to balance utility and' risk to
60. Henderson, Renewed Judicial Controversy, supra note 2, at 801.
61. This does not imply that all absolute liability cases reaching a jury will result in
verdicts for the plaintiff. Issues of causation must be resolved against the defendant to the
satisfaction of the jury.
62. 20 Cal. 3d 413, 573, P.2d 443, 143 Cal. Rptr. 225 (1978).
63. The California Supreme Court offered the following guidance to its trial courts:
[A] trial judge may properly instruct the jury that a product is defective in
design (1) if the plaintiff demonstrates that the product failed to perform as
safely as an ordinary consumer would expect when used in an intended or rea-
sonably foreseeable manner, or (2) if the plaintiff proves that the product's de-
sign proximately caused his injury and the defendant fails to prove, in light of
the relevant factors..., that on balance the benefits of the challenged design
outweigh the risk of danger inherent in such design.
Id. at 435, 573 P.2d at 456-58, 143 Cal. Rptr. at 239-40.
64. See Keeton, Design Hazards, supra note 2; Keeton, The Meaning of Defect, supra
note 2; Wade, On Design Defects, supra note 2; Wade, On the Nature of Strict Liability
supra note 2.
65. See Wade, On Design Defects, supra note 2, 572-73. The argument against specifi-
cally instructing the jury is based on fear that the jury "might lay aside its own intuitive
judgments." Donaher, Piehler, Twerski, and Weinstein, The Technological Expert in Product
Liability Litigation, 52 TEx. L. REV. 1303, 1309 n.29 (1974).
66. See Wade, On Design Defects, supra note 2, at 575. Dean Wade cites Professor
David Fischer as the only scholar urging that the decision that a design is unreasonably dan-
gerous is a matter of law for the judge. See Fischer, Products Liability, supra note 2, at 114.
67. See Wade, On Design Defects, supra note 2, at 570. The Azzarello court quoted
Dean Wade on the issue of specifically instructing a jury on the factors to be balanced in a
negligence case. Dean Wade had argued that the jury "ordinarily" is not given the factors but
that when one of the factors is of "especial significance" the judge may bring it to the atten-
tion of the jury. Azzarello v. Black Brothers Co., 480 Pa. 547, 557, 391 A.2d 1020, 1026
determine actionability of the design. 8 This view of jury function is
founded upon the idea that determination that a particular product
should be subject to the rules of strict liability depends upon whether
it is unreasonably dangerous.69 Determining "reasonableness" in a
traditional negligence case is an issue of fact to be resolved by the
jury.70 Although negligence cases depend upon proof related to the
defendant's conduct and products liability cases depend upon proof
related to the product's condition, the considerations to be balanced
are similar.7' Courts are divided over whether the standard given to
the jury should be based upon the "reasonable expectations of the
ordinary consumer ' 72 or the risk-utility balancing tests73 or a combi-
nation of the two.7 4 Nevertheless, a common thread running through
these cases is that the formulation given to the jury should be rela-
tivistic and should include a determination based upon notions of
reasonableness.75
E. Proposal
The analysis advanced in Azzarello may have been based on the
concern expressed by the court in Cronin v. J.B.E. Olson Corp. that
juries could be confused by the Restatement terminology.70 The no-
tion that the jury should not be involved in the balancing function,
however, can not be gleaned from either Cronin or Berkebile v.
Brantly Helicopter Corp.77 The Azzarello court justified its realloca-
(1978) (quoting Wade, On the Nature of Strict Liability, supra note 2, at 840). Although the
court relied upon Dean Wade's work, it concluded that the jury should not balance.
68. See Wade, On Design Defects, supra note 2, at 570.
69. Id.
70. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §328C comment b (1977); W. PROSSER,
THE LAW OF TORTS §37 at 207 (4th ed. 1971).
71. Several courts have noted the similarity between design cases and traditional negli-
gence actions. See, e.g. Knippen v. Ford Motor Co., 546 F.2d 993 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (trier of
fact in a design case is guided by a negligence-type balancing test); Cormier v. Foremost
Insurance Co., 405 So. 2d 610 (La. App. 1981) (standard for defective design approaches
negligence standard); Freund v. Cellofilm Properties, Inc., 87 N.J. 229, 432 A.2d 925 (1981)
(adequacy of a design necessarily depends upon its reasonableness). Academic literature con-
curs. See, Wade, On Design Defects, supra note 2, at 570; Henderson, Renewed Judicial Con-
troversy, supra note 2, at 777-79.
72. See Casrell v. Altec Ind., 335 So. 2d 128 (Ala. 1976); Lester v. Magic Chef, Inc.,
230 Kan. 643, 641 P.2d 353 (1982).
73. See Phillips v. Kimwood Mach. Co., 269 Or. 581, 525 P.2d 1033 (1974); Turner v.
General Motors Corp., 584 S.W.2d 844 (Tex. 1979).
74. See Barker v. Lull Engineering Co., Inc., 20 Cal. 3d 413, 573 P.2d 443, 143 Cal.
Rptr. 225 (1978); Suter v. San Angelo Foundry & Mach. Co., 81 N.J. 150, 406 A.2d 140
(1979); Knitz v. Minster Mach. Co., 69 Ohio St. 2d 460, 432 N.E.2d 814 (1982).
75. As Dean Wade indicates, the particular linguistic formulation chosen by the court
is not really vital so long as it indicates "the balancing process involved in applying the stan-
dard." Wade, On Design Defects, supra note 2, at 571.
76. See supra notes 37-40 and accompanying text.
77. in Berkebile v. Brantly Helicopter Co., the Pennsylvania Supreme Court described
the jury's function in terms which indicate that a weighing of factors is appropriate: "The jury
should view the relative degrees of danger associated with the use of the product since a
greater degree of danger requires a greater degree of protection." 462 Pa. 83, 102, 337 A.2d
tion of the balancing function on the grounds that a lay jury is inca-
pable of considering broad policy implications and will reach im-
proper decisions because of its inexperience with policy-analysis.7 8
Despite its reasons its altering the jury's traditional role, the Az-
zarello court was unable to point to any specific instance of jury
incompetence. In a major products case decided just one year before
Azzarello, a federal district court judge expressed his faith in the
intelligence and capacity of jurors to deal with cases involving design
defects.79 The judge noted that defendants are as likely to prevail as
plaintiffs in these cases.80
Notwithstanding the working and implications of the Azzarello
jury instructions, decisions rendered under Azzarello indicate that
cases are being decided evenly.81 Perhaps the "fundamental capabil-
ity of jurors to fairly arbitrate design cases"8 2 means that they act
"reasonably" even when given instructions which seem to preclude
such behavior.83
The observation that a jury of laypersons may be capable of
rising above its appointed duties (or alternatively, exceeding its au-
thority), however, does not justify continued prohibition against jury
balancing. Courts interpreting the Azzarello decision rely on the
dicta emphasizing that manufacturers are not insurers. But this dicta
is unhelpful to jurors. They will hear only the words of the approved
jury instructions unadorned by the Azzarello court's analytic prem-
ises." The likelihood that the instructions will lead a jury to mistak-
enly impose a higher standard of liability than that intended by the
Azzarello court is greater than would be the case if the instructions
themselves explicitly incorporated language permitting balancing of
competing variables. Instructions incorporating such a balancing test
would provide better insurance against mistaken application of abso-
lute liability. Adoption of a design defect test similar to that devel-
oped by the California Supreme Court in Barker v. Lull Engineering
Co., Inc.,s" would create a workable and comprehensible instruction
893, 902 (1975).
78. Henderson, Renewed Judicial Controversy, supra note 2, at 799. The question
whether a judge is more qualified to perform such analysis in design is discussed infra notes
136-146 and accompanying text.
79. Bowman v. General Motors Corp., 427 F. Supp. 234, 245-46 (E.D. Pa. 1977).
80. Id.
81. See Lesnefsky v. Fischer & Porter Co., Inc., 527 F. Supp. 951 (E.D. Pa. 1980);
Sochansky v. Sears, Roebuck and Co., 477 F. Supp. 316 (E.D. Pa. 1979); LoBianco v. Prop-
erty Protection, Inc., 292 Pa. Super. 346, 437 A.2d 417 (1981).
82. Birnbaum, Unmasking the Test, supra note 2, at 638.
83. One writer believes that the Azzarello instruction has made the jury's balancing
task more "uncertain and speculative" but has not and will not reduce the jury's responsibility
to weigh risk and utility. O'Donnell, Design Limitation, supra note 2, at 1074.
84. O'Donnell, Design Limitation, supra note 2, at 1072-73.
85. 20 Cal. 3d 413, 573 P.2d 443, 143 Cal. Rptr. 225 (1978). The suggestion that the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court adopt a test similar to that articulated in Barker should not be
furthering the policies enunciated in Azzarello."
V. The Intended Use Limitation
A. Limiting Liability Through the "Intended Use" Doctrine
Although the jury instructions posed in Azzarello v. Black
Brothers Co., intimate a standard of absolute liability for injuries
caused by a defendant's product, they also limit cases in which lia-
bility may be imposed to those involving intended uses.87 Professor
Twerski's analysis indicates that the intended use limitation offsets
potentially limitless liability resulting from the elimination of jury
balancing.88 He characterizes the instructions as consistent with
those used in other jurisdictions that incorporate a consumer expec-
tation standard. 89
The California decision in Cronin v. J.B.E. Olson Corp.,9" upon
which Azzarello largely depends, did not limit manufacturer liability
to those injuries arising during intended uses of their products. 91 In-
stead, the Cronin court expanded the range of uses to include all
uses which are "reasonably foreseeable"." The Pennsylvania Su-
preme Court's determination to remove negligence terminology from
its charge may have precluded its use of this phrase. If so, such an
interpretation of Cronin is not only inaccurate, but is also contrary
to the policy of decreasing the plaintiff's burden.9"
construed as a wholesale endorsement of the Barker standard. The proposal made here would
not include the shift in the burden of proof included in Barker. See infra notes 169-174 and
accompanying text. The Barker test is quoted supra note 63.
86. The Barker court felt that its test had established a definition of defect that
stopped "short of making the manufacturer an insurer for all injuries which may result from
the use of its product." Barker v. Lull Engineering Co., Inc., 20 Cal. 3d 413, 432, 573 P.2d
443, 456, 143 Cal. Rptr. 225, 238 (1978).
87. See supra text accompanying note 18.
88. Twerski, Enhancing Judicial Screening, supra note 2, at 923.
89. Id. See, e.g., Lester v. Magic Chef, Inc., 230 Kan. 643, 653, 641 P.2d 353, 361
(1982).
90. 8 Cal. 3d 121, 501 P.2d 1153, 104 Cal. Rptr. 433 (1972).
91. The California Supreme Court in Cronin strenuously opposed a restrictive view of
product uses which would be appropriate in a strict liability case: "The design and manufac-
ture of products should not be carried out in an industrial vacuum but with recognition of the
realities of their everyday use." 8 Cal. 3d 121, 126, 501 P.2d 1153, 1157, 104 Cal. Rptr. 433,
437 (1972). The court concluded that a manufacturer should only escape liability "when in-
jury results from a use of its product that is not reasonably foreseeable." Id. The same reason-
ing was adopted by the California court in Barker v. Lull Engineering Co., Inc., 20 Cal. 3d
413, 427 n.9, 573 P.2d 443, 452 n.9, 143 Cal. Rptr. 433, 437 n.9 (1978).
92. 8 Cal. 3d at 126, 501 P.2d at 1157, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 437.
93. "The rationale of Azzarello was to relieve the plaintiff of added burdens of proving
elements that ring of negligence, yet the elevation of 'intended use' to a supplier's defense ...
would impose the ultimate burden upon the consumer-the burden of proving the manufac-
turer/seller's subjective intent." Sherk v. Daisy-Heddon, 498 Pa. 594, 630, 450 A.2d 615, 634
(1982) (Larsen, J., dissenting).
B. Application Problems
The courts applying the "intended use" doctrine have often con-
strued the phrase in ways similar to the "reasonably foreseeable use"
limitation applied in other jurisdictions." For example, the plaintiff
in Pradel v. Porsche-Audi a was injured when she grabbed the han-
dle of her car door in an effort to stop herself from falling. Her
finger caught in the trigger mechanism of the door and had to be
partially amputated. She alleged that the trigger mechanism was de-
fectively designed. 96 Defendant moved for summary judgment, argu-
ing that the plaintiff "could not have reasonably expected the door
handle to provide adequate protection from a fall and that her con-
tact with the door handle was not compatible with its intended pur-
pose or use.97 The court denied defendant's motion holding that the
manufacturer did intend that the door handle be "grasped". 9a Such a
construction of "intended use" stretches the doctrine to the point
where it is indistinguishable from a "reasonable foreseeable use"
limitation." The court could have held that the door handle was in-
tended to facilitate only entry into the car. Under such a view, denial
of summary judgment would have been more problematic.
Conversely, in Leach v. Jagenberg-Werke A. G.,100 intended use
was interpreted narrowly, where as a "reasonably foreseeable use"
analysis would have been particularly appropriate. In Leach, the
court found that a manufacturer was not liable for injuries caused by
his coating machine. While the manufacturer had provided a tool to
insure safe rethreading of the machine, there was testimony that
workers at the plant did not use the tool because it was inconvenient
and "wasted a lot of time". 101 The court held that the product was
not defective because plaintiff could have utilized the rethreading de-
94. Indeed, one federal district court interpreting Azzarello held that "a product is
defective if it is not safe for its intended, or other reasonably foreseeable use." Bundie v. Skil
Corp., 489 F. Supp. 19, 19 (E.D. Pa. 1980) (emphasis added). As authority for this proposi-
tion, the court cited both Azzarello and an earlier case, Eshbach v. W. T. Grant Co., 481 F.2d
940 (3d Cir. 1973). The Eshbach court stated that a manufacturer "is required to foresee an
injury resulting from a defect, which injury occurs during the use of the [product] for apur-
pose for which is was intended, even if the injury did not occur in the particular manner one
might expect." Id. at 943. This construction does not support the Bundie court's expansion of
permissible plaintiff's uses into the area of reasonably foreseeable uses. The Eshbach formula-
tion merely restates the intended use limitation with the caveat that the manner in which a
plaintiff gets hurt while using the product as intended need not have been anticipated. The
Bundle court wrongly concluded from this that a plaintiff may recover if injured while using
the product in an unintended but reasonably foreseeable manner.
95. 512 F. Supp. 1004 (E.D. Pa. 1981).
96. Id.
97. Id. (emphasis added).
98. Id. The court was not swayed by the fact that plaintiff was not attempting to enter
the car at the time she "grasped" the door handle. Id.
99. See supra note 91.
100. 480 F. Supp. 244 (E.D. Pa. 1979).
101. Id. at 245.
vice and thereby avoided his injury.102 The court did not address the
foreseeability of workers seeking the most convenient way to
rethread the machine.10 3 In view of the liberalized notions of strict
liability fostered in Pennsylvania,' 0 ' such an inquiry seems appropri-
ate. Under a strict interpretation of Azzarello's concept of "defect,"
however, the Leach court's analysis is justified.
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C. Proposal
The intended use limitations may serve to decrease the possibil-
ity that juries will mistakenly impose insurer liability on a manufac-
turer. The scope of uses that give rise to strict liability, however, is
unclear. 06 Courts have been unable to agree on which uses are ac-
tionable. This divergence may be the result of confusion created by
tension between the liberalizing policy of Azzarello and the restric-
tive nature of an intended use limitation. 07 A court interpreting Az-
zarello as decreasing the plaintiff's burden in strict liability cases
may be more likely to construe "intended use" expansively in accor-
dance with the Pradel court. 08 A court reading the "intended use"
language in Azzarello as a hedge to the otherwise expansive defini-
tion of "defect" may interpret the phrase restrictively, as did the
court in Leach. 09
To the extent that Azzarello bars all use of negligence terminol-
ogy in a strict liability case," 0 it does plaintiffs a disservice. The
Azzarello court feared that use of the phrase "unreasonably danger-
102. Id. at 246.
103. Such inquiry is considered proper by courts in other jurisdictions. For example, a
Louisiana appellate court has defined "normal use" as a matter of "foreseeable use" which
"may include something broader than operation exactly in accordance with the manufacturer's
instructions." Cobb v. Insured Lloyds, 387 So. 2d 13, 18 (La. App. 1980). Other courts impose
a duty on the manufacturer to anticipate all "conditions and circumstances that will
foreseeably attend the use of the product." Kennedy v. Custom Ice and Equip. Co., Inc., 271
S.C. 171, 176, 246 S.E.2d 176, 178 (1978).
104. See, e.g., Brown v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 696 F.2d 246, 251 (3d Cir. 1982)
(Pennsylvania is a liberal state in the area of strict products liability); DiSalvatore v. United
States, 499 F. Supp. 338, 343 (E.D. Pa. 1980) (Pennsylvania has imposed a burden on defen-
dants that is even stricter than that embodied in §402A).
105. Professor Twerski's analysis of Azzarello concludes by stating that the intended use
limitation actually has contracted the scope of the manufacturer's duty in Pennsylvania. Twer-
ski, Enhanced Judicial Screening, supra note 2, at 925. His analysis was limited to the lan-
guage of Azzarello and was not concerned with its subsequent application by lower courts.
106. See Sherk v. Daisy Heddon, 498 Pa. 594, 630, 450 A.2d 615, 634 (1982) (Larsen,
J., dissenting). For a critical view of the Sherk court's treatment of the intended use limitation
in the context of a failure to warn case, see generally Donaher, A Response to Sherk, supra
note 2.
107. See supra note 93. Justice Larsen's position that the intended use limitation should
be viewed as a minimum duty of the manufacturer was based upon his reading of the policy
basis of Azzarello. Professor Twerski's analysis implies that the "intended use" limitation es-
tablishes the extent of a manufacturer's duty. See supra note 105.
108. See supra notes 95-99 and accompanying text.
109. See supra notes 100-105 and accompanying text.
110. See Smialek v. Chrysler Motors Corp., 290 Pa. Super. 496, 434 A.2d 1253 (1981).
ous" in a definition of "defect" would mislead jurors into considering
the conduct of the defendant, thereby increasing plaintiff's burden of
proof."1 Such fears are unwarranted where the "reasonably foresee-
able" phrase is used solely to describe a plaintiff's use of the product.
A number of courts outside the Commonwealth have imposed
liability on manufacturers even where plaintiffs use of the product
was not compatible with its intended use or purpose."' Barker v.
Lull Engineering Co., Inc."3 is especially significant because the
California Supreme Court devised a bifurcated test for "defect" that
differs from, yet is similar to, the Restatement language barred by
Cronin."4 The Barker court emphasized that Cronin mandated use
of negligence language in cases in which plaintiff's use of the prod-
uct may have been the proximate cause of any damage." 5 Focus on
the foreseeability of plaintiff's use does reflect a standard negligence
analysis." 6 Merely because the jury is required to determine the rea-
sonableness of plaintiffs conduct, however, does not mean that they
will import this standard into their consideration of the product. An
instruction carefully worded to focus the jury's attention on the
product's safety will safeguard against any confusion arising from
use of negligence language. If the instruction is intended to simplify
plaintiff's burden, and this negligence terminology has that effect,
then courts should use it.
The most appropriate solution to this problem is to extend al-
lowable uses of a product to those that are "reasonably foreseeable".
The question of whether a specific use is reasonably foreseeable is a
jury question." 7 A court must take care to ensure that the jury does
not confuse the reasonableness of plaintiffs use with the reasonable-
ness of defendant's conduct." 8
I 11. See supra note 17 and accompanying text.
112. See Barker v. Lull Engineering Co., Inc., 20 Cal. 3d 413, 573 P.2d 443, 143 Cal.
Rptr. 225 (1978); Henkel v. City of Sawyer, 228 Kan. 439, 618 P.2d 788 (1980); Suter v. San
Angelo Foundry and Mach. Co., 81 N.J. 150, 406 A.2d 140 (1979); Knitz v. Minster Mach.
Co., 69 Ohio St. 2d 460, 432 N.E.2d 814 (1982).
113. 20 Cal. 3d 413, 573 P.2d 443, 143 Cal. Rptr. 225 (1978).
114. See supra note 63.
115. 20 Cal. 3d at 427 n.9, 573 P.2d at 443 n.9, 143 Cal. Rptr. at 234 n.9.
116. See, e.g., Micallef v. Miehle Co., 39 N.Y.2d 376, 348 N.E.2d 571, 384 N.Y.S.2d
115 (1976). The Micallef court required the plaintiff to prove that a manufacturer had not
exercised that "degree of care in his plan or design" which would avoid unreasonable risks of
harm when the product is used in the intended manner or in an "unintended yet reasonably
foreseeable" manner. 39 N.Y.2d at 386-87, 348 N.E.2d at 577, 384 N.Y.S.2d at 121.
117. See Thibault v. Sears, Roebuck and Co., 118 N.H.802, 809, 395 A.2d 843, 847-48
(1978).
118. Trial courts should refrain from giving the following recently revised draft of a jury
instruction on legal cause in products liability cases:
If you find that the product was defective, the defendant is liable for all harm
caused by such condition. A defective condition is the legal cause of harm if it
was a substantial factor in bringing such harm about. [In order for the plaintiff
to recover in this case, the defendant's conduct is the legal cause of the accident
whenever it appears that the conduct by defendant was a substantial factor in
VI. The Judge's Role
A. Reallocation of Function Under Azzarello
In Azzarello v. Black Brothers Co., the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court removed the risk-utility balancing analysis from jury consider-
ation when it outlined the relative functions of judge and jury in
strict liability cases.119 What little justification the court had for this
reallocation2 ° seemed to reflect suspicion of the ability of jurors to
decide questions involving broad policy issues."' Under Azzarello,
the judge's task is to examine the averments contained in the com-
plaint and, based upon this information, determine whether the prod-
uct's utility outweighs the danger it poses." 2 The court believed that
resolution of this question is a matter of law because it is beyond the
"orbit of a factual dispute". 2 s While the court did specify that
"averments of the complaint" should provide the basis for any deci-
sion, it did not specify at what stage in the adjudication the decision
should take place.
12 4
bringing about the accident.]
PENNSYLVANIA STANDARD JURY INSTRUCTION 8.04 (Civil) (Subcommittee Draft 1981)
(brackets in original). Although the instruction seems to apply the traditional "substantial
factor" analysis for causation, the Subcomittee Note indicates that the plaintiff's use, even
where abnormal, should not be considered an unforeseeable, superceding cause. Id. Such an
instruction is contrary to the express wording of Azzarello which states that only intended uses
give rise to strict liability. A trial court that gives the Azzarello instruction defining defect and
the above instruction defining causation could create an unacceptable level of confusion for the
jury.
119. 480 Pa. at 558, 391 A.2d at 1026.
120. See O'Donnell, Design Limitation, supra note 2, at 1073.
121. 480 Pa. at 558, 391 A.2d at 1026. Cf. Birnbaum, Unmasking the Test, supra note
2, at 637-38 (the Azzarello decision manifests the Pennsylvania court's fundamental disdain
for the adjudicative process); Henderson, Renewed Judicial Controversy, supra note 2. at 799
(the Pennsylvania court seems to imply that a jury of laypersons cannot be trusted to perform
cost-benefit analysis).
122. Supra note 19.
123. 480 Pa. at 558, 391 A.2d at 1026.
124. Dean Wade expressed his confusion on this point as follows:
The court may be saying that the jury merely determines the facts and that the
judge determines whether the product is actionable on those facts. But the
judge's decision is on the 'plaintiffs averment of the facts.' Is this treated like a
demurrer or motion to dismiss? Is this like strict liability of the type of Rylands
v. Fletcher, under which the judge decides as a matter of law whether an activ-
ity is abnormally dangerous and instructs the jury that strict liability is imposed
or negligence is required? Or is it the rule that since the law imposes strict
liability on products in general, the decision is already made for the judge?
From the opinion, one cannot be sure.
Wade, On Design Defects, supra note 2, at 561 (citation omitted). Professor Henderson is
similarly confused:
One could read the opinion as simply reaffirming the traditional role of the trial
judge in screening the adequacy of the plaintiff's case as a response to a defen-
dant's motion for directed verdict. But why, then, speak in terms of the trial
court's measuring the adequacy of the plaintiff's averments? And what, at a
minimum, must the plaintiff aver? . . . And if judicial screening for adequacy is
to take place at the pleading stage, from what source will the court obtain the
information necessary to undertake a cost-benefit analysis?
Henderson, Renewed Judicial Controversy, supra note 2, at 798-99.
B. Social Policy Implications of Risk-Utility Analysis in Design
Defect Cases
The idea that a balancing analysis in design defect cases is ap-
propriately a judicial function is based upon a recognition of the far
reaching consequences of characterizing an entire line of products as
defective. 12 5 From this perspective, the case resembles those involv-
ing "abnormally dangerous" activities under Restatement (Second)
of Torts section 520.' The ramifications of impugning a specific
design go far beyond the interests of individual parties in a particu-
lar case. To the defendant-manufacturer - and by implication all
others whose products incorporate a similar design - an adverse
finding can result in enormous liability. 12 7 A verdict for the plaintiff
signifies that such litigation can be successful and effectively encour-
ages more litigation.'2 8 In this way, the decision resembles one which
brands a particular activity" abnormally dangerous". 29
Frequent verdicts in favor of plaintiffs will have a severe impact
on society because manufacturers will be reluctant to innovate and
experiment with new designs.'3 0 For particularly utile products, the
social impact can be significantly more profound.' 3 ' Less expensive
products which are perfectly acceptable to most consumers might be-
125. See Twerski, Seizing the Middle Ground, supra note 2, at 544-45. Professor Twer-
ski is not in favor of putting the balancing entirely in the hands of the judge, but rather
believes that a "middle ground" can be reached which affords the judge more control over the
design case.
126. The Restatement lists the following factors to be considered in the court's determi-
nation whether a particular activity is unreasonably dangerous:
(a) the existence of a high degree of risk of some harm to the person, land
or chattels of others;
(b) likelihood that the harm that results from it will be great;
(c) inability to eliminate the risk by the exercise of reasonable care;
(d) extent to which the activity is not a matter of common usage;
(e) inappropriateness of the activity to the place it is carried on; and
(f) extent to which its value to the community is outweighed by its danger-
ous attributes.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §520 (1977). For a case applying the §520 factors, see
Langan v. Valicopters, Inc., 88 Wash. 2d 855, 567P.2d 218 (1977).
127. Twerski, Seizing the Middle Ground, supra note 2, at 545.
128. Id.
129. See Fischer, Products Liability, supra note 2, at 114-16; Wade, On the Nature of
Strict Liability, supra note 2, at 835. The Azzarello court sought to avoid giving the jury the
impression that products cases were similar to cases involving "abnormally dangerous" activi-
ties. 480 Pa. at 556, n.8, 391 A.2d at 1025 n.8. The court relied upon Dean Wade's analysis to
support its position. Ironically, Dean Wade has revised his position and now believes an ade-
quate jury instruction can easily prevent such misunderstanding. Wade, On Design Defects,
supra note 2, at 560.
130. See Twerski, Seizing the Middle Ground, supra note 2, at 544-45.
131. The utility described here refers to the product's value as a whole. This macro-level
utility differs from the notion of utility embodied in the balancing test used to determine the
reasonableness of the product's safety level. When scrutinizing product utility in a design case,
the trier of fact looks only at the design of the product and not at its general social utility. A
product with very high macro-level utility may still be "unreasonably dangerous" if its manu-
facturer chose a design which exposed the plaintiff to an unacceptable risk. See Wade, On
Design Defects, supra note 2, at 572.
come less available and more expensive simply because manufactur-
ers must pass on the cost of increased liability.1"2
Conversely, an overly protective judicial atmosphere similar to
that prevalent in the nineteenth century 83 will thwart policy goals at
the heart of the strict products liability doctrine. The Azzarello
court believed that industry no longer needed such extensive judicial
protection. The court cited the development of post-industrial society
and the changing socio-economic context of American life as justifi-
cations for affording plaintiffs more protection. 3 To ignore such
socio-economic changes and to continue the protection of industry
which characterized early stages of industrialization would fuel pop-
ular distrust and cynicism regarding the actual role of the judiciary
in American society.
The adjudication of a cause of action involving such important
social ramifications would seem to require considerable judicial over-
sight. Although Azzarello did not explain what policies should be
considered by the trial court, many courts have addressed policy is-
sues while reaching decisions favorable to defendants.3 5
C. Importance of Jury Participation in Decisions of "Reasonable"
Safety
The problem of reallocating judicial function would not be diffi-
cult if the risk-utility analysis were purely a policy issue.1 " Risk-
utility analysis, however, also determines reasonableness.' Accord-
ingly, this area requires a process similar to that employed in negli-
gence cases,138 and would seem particularly appropriate for jury de-
132. See Twerski, Seizing the Middle Ground, supra note 2, at 544-45. See also
Walkowiak, Reasonableness Revisited, supra note 2, at 743-44 (reduction in available prod-
ucts will result in a smaller pool of assets from which plaintiffs can recover their judgments).
133. See Azzarello v. Black Brothers Co., 480 Pa. 547, 553, 391 A.2d 1020, 1023
(1978).
134. Id. Professor Calabresi supports the position that risk of design liability should be
placed upon industry in a free-enterprise system. "The problem facing industry in the product
liability context is not, in the end, very different from the problem which faces a free enter-
prise society generally in deciding which goods are worth producing and what new entrants
into an industry are worth having." Calabresi, Product Liability: Curse or Bulwark of Free
Enterprise, 27 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 313, 323 (1978).
135. See, e.g., Davis v. Dwyer Indus., Inc., 548 F. Supp. 667 (E.D. Pa. 1982) (manufac-
turer not liable for injuries sustained by plaintiff due to tendency of product to become opaque
with age); Abdul-Warith v. Arthur G. McKee and Co., 488 F. Supp. 306 (E. D. Pa. 1980)
(the fact that the life of a replaceable part is shorter than the life of the whole product cannot
support a finding of defect because this would make the manufacturer an insurer); LoBianco v.
Property Protection, Inc., 292 Pa. Super. 346, 437 A.2d 417 (1981) (homeowner is better able
to insure against burglary than manufacturer-installer of defective burglar alarm system).
136. The analysis in such a case would more closely approximate that performed under
Restatement (Second) of Torts §520. See supra note 126.
137. See Aller v. Rodgers Mach. Co., 268 N.W.2d 830 (Iowa 1978).
138. "Whether the doctrine of negligence or strict liability is being used to impose liabil-
ity, the same process is going on in each instance, i.e., weighing the utility of the article
against the risk of its use." Id. at 835.
termination.' 9 Where the risk-utility analysis involves a close call, a
procedural framework which keeps the ultimate decision from a jury
demands extraordinary justification. "4 0 The Azzarello court assumes
that a judge - because of his more acute recognition of the policy
implications involved - is more capable than a jury of striking the
proper balance. " ' Whether this assumption reflects a distrust of the
jury's ability to decide complex design cases1 42 or a desire to place
policy analysis in the hands of judges, " " the Azzarello court did not
provide any compelling reason for remaining this decision from the
province of the jury.
Many design cases will require the judge to make close call de-
terminations concerning whether the balance tips in favor of utility
or risk. 4 A framework which allows such a "fact-sensitive"' 4 5 deci-
sion to be made by the judge prior to giving the case to the jury
cannot be justified by the vague, unspecified notions of public policy
in Azzarello. Indeed, such a framework may be beyond
justification.4 6
D. Procedural Context for Judicial Consideration of Risk and
Utility
Cases interpreting Azzarello differ over the appropriate proce-
dural moment for use of a judicial balancing analysis. Although Az-
zarello specifies that the judge should base his risk-utility test upon
the averments in the complaint, few courts have made decisions
based upon the pleadings alone.
In response to motions for summary judgment, the court in
Pradel v. Porsche-Audi" " made its risk-utility determination on the
basis of the complaint alone, even though the court had access to
discovery materials generated by both parties. After deciding that
139. See Liberty Mutual v. Sears, Roebuck and Co., 35 Conn. Supp. 687, 691, 406 A.2d
1254, 1257 (1979) (the determination of whether a product is unreasonably dangerous is a
question of fact for the jury).
140. See Henderson, Renewed Judicial Controversy, supra note 2, at 799-800.
141. 480 Pa. at 558, 391 A.2d at 1026.
142. See Henderson, Renewed Judicial Controversy, supra note 2, at 799.
143. See Fischer, Products Liability, supra note 2, at 114.
144. See Birnbaum, Unmasking the Test, supra note 2, at 638-39.
145. The "fact-sensitivity" of risk-utility analysis weighs strongly in favor of giving the
ultimate decision to the jury. Professor Keeton expressed this view as follows:
It may be that a jury system is not well suited to the complexities involved in deciding this
issue, and perhaps this is an argument for making the decision a question of law. This, how-
ever, would be difficult in many cases because of so much dispute regarding the facts as to
economic and technical feasibility as to safer design.
Keeton, Design Hazards, supra note 2, at 314.
146. "Allowing the judge to decide reasonableness, but not the jury, means that the jury
will not be able to operate to the full extent of its widely accepted province in the area of torts:
close findings of reasonableness." Henderson, Renewed Judicial Controversy, supra note 2, at
800 n.123.
147. 512 F. Supp. 1004 (E.D. Pa. 1981).
the case was appropriate for strict liability, the court went onto con-
sider all available discovery materials in accordance with the tradi-
tional summary judgment standards. 4 8 By adhering to the letter of
Azzarello, the Pradel court restricted itself to making a determina-
tion of "unreasonable danger" without fully examining the defen-
dant's case.
In Abdul-Warith v. Arthur G. McKee and Co.,"' the court did
consider the defendant's case before making a decision. The court
granted defendant's motion for summary judgment'"0 based upon in-
formation that would not have been available had only the aver-
ments of the complaint been consulted. 15
Because the Azzarello decision does not specify when the risk-
utility determination should be made, 5 it permits judicial decision-
making without sufficient factual foundation without considering
both sides of the case, at a point in the proceeding when sufficient
supporting materials are available. 5 ' The most appropriate point in
a trial for the judge to make a policy based risk-utility determination
is in response to a motion for directed verdict. Few decisions follow-
ing Azzarello have done this. There is, however, substantial sup-
port for such an approach." 5 At the directed verdict stage, the judge
has seen and heard the evidence that has gone before the jury and is
therefore able to determine with far more certainty whether a jury
question exists regarding imposition of strict liability. This is the mo-
ment when policy analysis can best be accomplished.""
E. Absence of Guiding Factors
Another problem with the Azzarello decision is that no explic-
itly enumerated factors are provided to guide the risk-utility analy-
sis. Although the court felt that an analysis of risk should be per-
148. Id. at 1005.
149. 488 F. Supp. 306 (E.D. Pa. 1980).
150. The Abdul-Warith court felt that allowing the plaintiff's case to go to trial would
be tantamount to holding the defendant liable as an insurer. Id. at 314.
151. Defendant showed that the part of the product which the plaintiff had averred to be
defective in design had simply become worn from ordinary wear and tear. Id. A judge examin-
ing only the complaint would not have had access to this critical information.
152. See supra note 124.
153. See Henderson, Renewed Judicial Controversy, supra note 2, at 798-99.
154. In Hammond v. International Harvester, 691 F.2d 646 (3d Cir. 1982), the court
ruled that by denying the defendant's motion for directed verdict the judge had made the
policy decision mandated by Azzarello. Whether the trial court judge was aware of this when
he made his decision is unknown.
155. Two of Professor Twerski's recent articles concerned the quality of directed verdict
practice in design litigation. See Twerski, Enhancing Judicial Screening, supra note 2; Twer-
ski, Seizing the Middle Ground, supra note 2.
156. Professor Twerski mistakenly assumes that Azzarello requires the judge to perform
a risk-utility test as part of a directed verdict decision. Twerski, Enhancing Judicial Screening,
supra note 2, at 925. Nonetheless, the point implicit in his analysis is well established. The
directed verdict stage is the best time for judicial consideration of risk and utility.
formed by a judge, it did not list the elements to be considered., 57
Although there is significant disagreement regarding the propriety of
instructing a jury by listing abstract factors, 1 8 it is generally agreed
that judges should balance competing variables by referring to a
standard set of factors. 159
The use of factors is considered by some commentators the only
way to mitigate the often inevitable complexity of litigating design
defect cases.160 The complexity of these cases is attributable to their
inherently "polycentric" nature, 6 ' which can be so severe as to
render these cases unadjudicable.6 2
Nevertheless, courts will continue to face highly polycentric de-
sign cases and will require detailed guidance to carry out their task.
If the decisional framework in which the judge operates is clear, the
polycentricity inherent in the complex design case' 63 can be de-
creased to an acceptable level.'
F. Enhancing Judicial Screening
Requiring judges to perform a rigorous factor analysis based
upon evidence adduced at trial will facilitate the screening of design
cases. Adoption of a two-pronged test for defect'65 will put the par-
ties on notice concerning their requisite elements of proof. Such a
bifurcated test separates the defect question into two discrete inquir-
ies. The first inquiry concerns whether the product performed as
safely as an ordinary person with the knowledge common to the
community would expect when the product is put to a normal use.' 66
157. 480 Pa. at 557-58, 391 A.2d at 1026. The court's only reference to factors is found
in a quote of Dean Wade listing the elements balanced in negligence cases. Id. It is unclear
whether the court intended the judge to utilize these factors in strict liability cases.
158. See Wade, On Design Defects, supra note 2, at 572-73.
159. See Phillips v. Kimwood Mach. Co., 269 Or. 485, 525 P.2d 1033 (1974). See also
Wade, On the Nature of Strict Liability, supra note 2, at 840.
160. See Twerski, Seizing the Middle Ground, supra note 2, at 550-51.
161. Professor Henderson described polycentric problems as "many-centered problems,
in which each point for decision is related to all the others as are the strands of a spider web.
If one strand is pulled, a complex pattern of readjustments will occur throughout the entire
web." Henderson, Judicial Review of Design Choices, supra note 2, at 1536. While making
product design decisions, "the engineer must place relative values upon a multitude of factors.
The decisions he makes regarding these factors are as interrelated and interdependent as the
strands of an intricate web." Id. at 1540.
162. See Henderson, Judicial Review of Design Choices, supra note 2.
163. The polycentricity problem is not extreme in every design case. Cases involving
simple designs, alterations of which have minimal repercussions for other elements of the prod-
uct, may present no problem for the traditional adjudicatory structure. See Twerski, Seizing
the Middle Ground, supra note 2, at 551-53.
164. See Bowman v. General Motors Corp., 427 F. Supp. 234, 242 (E.D. Pa. 1977). See
Twerski, Weinstein, Donaher and Piehler, The Use and Abuse of Warnings in Products Lia-
bility-Design Defect Litigation Comes of Age, 61 CORNELL L. REV. 495, 539 (1976).
165. See supra note 63.
166. See supra note 63. The first prong of the test is the consumer expectation standard.
See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §402A comment i (1977).
In the risk-utility prong of the test, the plaintiff's proofs will be
similar to those adduced in a negligence action. 67 Since adjudication
of strict liability design cases ultimately requires a determination
whether defendant's choice of design was unreasonably dangerous,
there will be no practical distinction between theories in the majority
of cases.1 8 Under both negligence and strict liability theories plain-
tiff seeks to prove that defendant should have adopted a more rea-
sonable design and that by doing so the injuries suffered could have
been avoided.
The bifurcated test described above is similar to the one
adopted by the California Supreme Court in Barker v. Lull Engi-
neering Co., Inc.169 Before adopting the Barker test, however, a mod-
ification should be made. As it now exists, the second prong of the
test shifts the burden of proof to the defendant after the plaintiff
makes a prima facie showing of causation.17 0 Such a shift does not
enhance a judge's ability to screen at the directed verdict stage be-
cause the plaintiff can easily meet this burden.' Instead, the plain-
tiff should be required to show an alternative design which is feasible
and does not significantly reduce the product's utility.172 If the plain-
tiff cannot prove that such a design existed when the defendant
made the design choice, then the plaintiff must show that there were
"available and reasonable steps ' 17 3 which the defendant could have
taken to decrease the danger. Evidence that other manufacturers of
similar products have not taken such steps helps prove that an alter-
native design may not have been "available and reasonable", but it is
not dispositive.17' Defendant can rebut the plaintiff's evidence by
demonstrating that the alternative design is either technologically in-
feasible or is so drastic that it would destroy the product's utility.
When the case involves a product designed in compliance with
167. See Wade, On the Nature of Strict Liability, supra note 2, at 841; Henderson,
Renewed Judicial Controversy, supra note 2, at 777.
168. "Since the design ultimately adopted reflects the reasonableness of the manufac-
turer's choices in adopting it, . . . the basic cost-benefit analysis undertaken in assessing liabil-
ity will be substantially the same under either strict liability or negligence." Henderson, Re-
newed Judicial Controversy, supra note 2, at 777.
169. 20 Cal. 3d 413, 573 P.2d 443, 143 Cal. Rptr. 225 (1978).
170. Id. at 435, 573 P.2d at 457-58, 143 Cal. Rptr. at 239-40.
171. The true significance of the Barker rule on the burden of proof is its effect on
determining when a design case goes to the jury. Barker declares that the requirement for a
'prima facie showing [is] that the injury was proximately caused b& the product's design.' If
this is enough to take the case to the jury, the role of the judge will be substantially lessened
and cases not going to the jury will be few indeed.
Wade, On Design Defects, supra note 2, at 573 (citations omitted).
172. Id.
173. Thibault v. Sears, Roebuck and Co., 118 N.H. 802, 807, 395 A.2d 843, 846
(1978).
174. A "custom of the trade" defense will not suffice to rebut the plaintiff's case. As in
the ordinary negligence case, adherence to custom is not a complete defense. See Incollingo v.
Ewing, 444 Pa. 263, 282 A.2d 206 (1971).
regulations promulgated by a governmental agency responsible for
establishing safety standards,the issue becomes more difficult.1 75 Re-
ciprocal shifting burdens could be placed on the parties to show why
such standards are, or are not, adequate. Justice Linde of the Ore-
gon Supreme Court described the process in these words:
[W]hen the design of a product is subject not only to prescribed
performance standards but to government supervised testing and
specific approval or disapproval on safety grounds, no further
balance whether the product is 'unreasonably dangerous' for its
intended or foreseeable use under the conditions for which it is
approved needs to be struck by a court or a jury unless one of
two things can be shown: either that the standards of safety and
utility assigned to the regulatory scheme are less inclusive or de-
manding than the premises of the law of products liability, or
that the regulatory agency did not address the allegedly defec-
tive element of the design or is some way fell short of its as-
signed task.
17 6
Later in his opinion, Justice Linde described the proper allocation of
burdens with regard to this issue:
[1]t should be the defendant's burden to show that a governmen-
tal agency has undertaken the responsibility of making substan-
tially the same judgment that the court would otherwise be
called onto make; and if so, it would then be the plaintiff's bur-
den to show that the responsible agency has not in fact made
that judgment with respect to the particular design.77
A decision to deny the defendant's motion for directed verdict will
not necessarily indicate that the regulations are inadequate. It may
simply indicate that the analysis by which the agency reached the
safety standard was significantly different from that appropriate to
determining "unreasonable danger". 7 8
A judge deciding motions for directed verdicts in a case in
which the parties must meet the burdens described above will be far
more capable of making fact sensitive, policy oriented decisions.
VII. Summary
The Azzarello decision has generated an unacceptable and un-
necessary level of confusion. Although judges must perform a sub-
stantial screening function in design cases, they must also defer to
the jury's decision on the ultimate issue of whether the design em-
175. See Twerski, Seizing the Middle Ground, supra note 2, at 576-78.
176. Wilson v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 282 Or. 61, -, 577 P.2d 1322, 1335 (1975)
(Linde, J., concurring).
177. Id. at -, 577 P.2d at 1335 (Linde, J., concurring).
178. Id. at -, 577 P.2d at 1335 (Linde, J., concurring).
bodied "unreasonable danger". To facilitate the judge's task, explicit
factors should be enumerated for determining whether the parties
have met their respective burdens. The danger that a jury may de-
cide cases in which the plaintiff has shown only proximate cause can
be eliminated by putting a substantial burden on the plaintiff. The
burden is also justified by reference to similarity between design
cases and traditional negligence actions. Unlike the case where the
plaintiff is injured by a product which contained a manufacturing
defect, the design defect case ultimately concerns a decision-making
process. 17 9 Liberal use of discovery can make evidence necessary to
establish a prima facie case available to the plaintiff. Of course, the
more extensive the evidence, the greater the likelihood that the judge
will make an appropriate decision on a motion for directed verdict.
Furthermore, charging both judge and jury with making determina-
tions of reasonableness via a balancing analysis will guarantee the
parties a meaningful opportunity to present their cases.18
In addition, elimination of "guarantor" language and the "in-
tended use" limitation and the adoption of a bifurcated test for de-
fect reduces the chance that jurors will be misled into thinking that
absolute liability is being imposed. The Barker decision shows that a
relativistic test can be worded without any reference to "reasonable-
ness".18' This formulation provides adequate guidance to plaintiffs,
defendants, and jurors.
By adopting these changes, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court
can remedy the uncertainty created by its Azzarello decision. At the
same time, more informed judicial decision-making would advance
important policy objectives. While the proposal advanced here does
not eliminate the "open-ended social policy question presented by the
general reasonableness standard",182 it does help clarify that stan-
dard. Appellate courts will be better able to render decisions which
clearly set out the general legal standards to be applied in design
defect cases. 183
179. See generally Twerski, Weinstein, Donaher and Piehler, Shifting Perspectives in
Products Liability: From Quality to Process Standards, 55 N.Y.U.L. REV. 347 (1980).
180. "If cost-benefit analysis is an essential part of the product design liability, and if
judges may appropriately employ that analysis to screen the sufficiency of plaintiff's averments
on a case-by-case basis, then juries should be allowed to participate in that analysis in cases
given them to decide." Henderson, Renewed Judicial Controversy, supra note 2, at 799-800.
181. See supra notes 62-63 and accompanying text.
182. See Henderson, Creative Judging, supra note 2, 849, n.19.
183. Ultimately, the composite of appellate decisions will generate specific rules applica-
ble to design defect cases. The existence of a set of judicial rules makes predicting the outcome
of an anticipated litigation easier and more accurate. This, in turn, increases the rate of out-of-
court settlements and provides concrete guidelines to product designers. See Ehrlich and Pos-
ner, An Economic Analysis of Legal Rulemaking, 3 J. LEGAL STUD. 257, 264 (1974).
VIII. Conclusion
Responsibility for adjudication of design defect litigation is
properly placed upon the courts. To properly perform their functions,
judges and juries require clearly articulated guidelines which are
consistent with traditional tort law theories. Azzarello v. Black
Brothers Co. does not provide such guidelines. The proposal ad-
vanced in this comment sets forth a framework in which judges and
juries can fairly and responsibly discharge their duties in design de-
fect cases.
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